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SOME THOUGHTS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
IN OKLAHOMA
Orley R. Lilly, Jr.*
Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as
old as law. Not to go outside our own legal system, discontent
has an ancient and unbroken pedigree.
I Pound, 1906
In the latter half of the decade of the 1960s, the people of Okla-
homa endorsed proposals of their Legislature and thereby accomplished
significant and needed reforms in the judicial department of the state.
On May 3, 1966, article VII-A was added to the Oklahoma Constitution
-a Court on the Judiciary was thus created and invested with power
over the tenure of Oklahoma judges. Two additional judicial articles
were adopted on July 11, 1967. Article VII-B provided that justices
of the supreme court and judges of the court of criminal appeals shall
be appointed by the Governor from nominees submitted by a Judicial
Nominating Commission and that their retention in office shall be de-
termined only on the basis of their records. More significant, however,
was the adoption of a new article VII, which created a single trial court
of general jurisdiction and a unified court system under the supervision
and control of the supreme court. The accomplishments of this re-
form era have elsewhere been well chronicled by others and will not
be repeated here.
The purpose of this essay is to question the system where short-
comings are known to exist and to propose alternatives or changes not
only to resolve problems now faced but at the same time better to equip
the judicial department for meeting probable future needs.
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A.
Southwestern of Memphis; J.D. Washington University; LL.M. University of Illinois.
This article was completed prior to the 1974 session of the Oklahoma Legislature
-Ed.
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Apparently, the pedigree of discontent of which Dean Pound
spoke is yet unbroken. In his 1973 report to the Legislature, the Chief
Justice identified four areas in which reform critically is needed: judi-
cial manpower, defense services, judicial salaries and appellate court
dockets.' Discussion may thus begin with these four topics.
Defense Services
Since 1963, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
have increasingly required the states to provide defense services to indi-
gents who face possible confinement. Even today those services are ren-
dered by court-appointed counsel in all but the three Oklahoma coun-
ties in which public defender systems have been established. Chief Jus-
tice Davison has proposed two reform measures. One is to eliminate
the possibility of confinement for minor offenses where it seldom has
been imposed and seems unnecessary for effective enforcement. In sug-
gesting the second needed reform-creation of a statewide defense serv-
ice independent of the judiciary-the Chief Justice has forcefully point-
ed out the principal reason for it: "Judicial operation of defense serv-
ices is totally incompatible with the judge's traditionally neutral posi-
tion. There is as little basis for a judge to control the choice and com-
pensation of defense counsel as there is for him to control public pros-
ecution."'2  Such a system may tend incidentally to ease another prob-
lem, docket congestion in the court of criminal appeals, by reducing
the frequency of constitutional and other error creeping into criminal
trials. The matter merits high legislative priority.
Judicial Manpower
According to the Chief Justice, the judicial manpower problem
primarily results from "serious geographical maldistribution in Oklaho-
ma judgeships."3
In most respects, Oklahoma's new judicial article was "written in
broad strokes, with quill pens and little ink." 4  Unfortunately, but no
doubt a legislative compromise necessity, it requires that "[t]here shall
1. Report by Chief Justice Denver N. Davison to the Oklahoma Legislature in
44 OKLA. B. Ass'N J. 529 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Report].
2. Report at 530.
3. Id.
4. The quoted language is that of Judge Shirley Hufstedler, of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Hufstedler, Constitutional Revision and Ap-
pellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. 1Ev. 577, 579 (1969).
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be at least one Associate District Judge for each County in the State."'
Although the supreme court has the power to assign any trial judge
to sit anywhere in the state," the exercise of that power as a practical
matter may be limited. Certainly the supreme court is not obligated
to, nor should it, geographically redistribute the judiciary by wholesale
"permanent" assignments. The court should nonetheless continue tem-
porarily to assign judges as may be necessary and, in spite of "growing
resistance" to assignments noted by the court,7 it should fully utilize
available judicial manpower, at least within a judicial district.
Several reasons can be advanced for repeal of the one-associate-
district-judge-per-county requirement. There is the already noted
waste of available judicial manpower. The provision denies the Legis-
lature and the court needed flexibility in dealing with docket realities.
In counties where the lawyer population is small, the people often have
little choice, if any at all, in the selection of an associate district judge;
in other counties a large pool of talent is left relatively untapped. Fi-
nally the provision reduces the Legislature's ability to make uniform
statewide and to raise qualifications for the office.
Legislative efforts to repeal the one-associate-district-judge-per-
county provision should continue. Should those efforts fail, the people
should take the initiative. Moreover if the provision be repealed, the
office of associate district judge should itself be eliminated. The con-
stitution makes little distinction in qualifications for the office of district
judge and that of associate district judge. Whereas the former must
have a minimum of four years' experience in Oklahoma as a licensed
practicing attorney or court-of-record judge, the latter need be only an
attorney licensed to practice in the state. The Legislature may, how-
ever, make uniform the qualifications for both offices.8 No sound rea-
son can be advanced to support the need for "black-robed" and "gray-
robed" judges. Although Oklahoma's courts have not so far degener-
ated into a dual system of trial courts, a system which article VII explic-
itly abolished, that possibility nonetheless exists.'
5. ORLA. CONST. art. VII, § 8(d).
6. Id. § 8(i).
7. Report at 529.
8. OK.A. CoNsT. art. VIL § 8(g).
9. See id. § 8(d). Judge Hufstedler has said that a dual system of trial courts
is sometimes supported by the "sticks" theory--"neither the size of the problems nor
the size of the population requires the services of a big court or even a big judge.
The urban variation . . . preserves the small problems rationale." Hufstedler, supra
note 4, at 580-81.
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"No one can quarrel with the ideas that sparsely populated areas
need ready access to courts and that the quantity of work in rural areas
does not necessarily warrant a live-in, full-time judge." 10  The need
for additional judges in heavily populated urban areas must be met,
and at the same time the availability to rural populations of courts of
high quality should steadfastly be maintained.
Why cannot a single judge of a single trial court ride circuit
through the rural areas to handle the caseloads, assisted by
commissioners or referees [or special district judges] at-
tached to the same court, who can take care of chamber
business and likewise serve as judges or magistrates pro
tempore to handle routine civil matters and to adjudicate
minor criminal offenses?"
Judicial Salaries
It cannot be denied that in Oklahoma judicial compensation is
woefully inadequate. Some may call it stingy. In 1972, with salaries
of trial judges ranging from $13,500 to $20,500, when the national
average was $26,265 and the median $25,000, Oklahoma ranked be-
low all other states and the District of Columbia. In the same year
the compensation of members of the two highest appellate courts, at
$25,000, placed Oklahoma in a four-way tie in thirty-eighth place and
well below the national average of $31,115 and the median, $30,000.12
Neither the increases effective in July, 1973, nor approved for July,
1974, appear sufficient to raise significantly Oklahoma's low ranking.' 8
Oklahoma is indeed fortunate to have so many excellent judges,
most of whom are serving at considerable financial sacrifice. Increas-
ing compensation to a realistic level would tend not only to increase
the number of lawyers who might be willing to assume the bench but
to reduce the number of judges leaving the bench primarily for finan-
cial reasons, a problem which Chief Justice Davison laid squarely in
the lap of the Legislature: "Recent resignations from the state judicial
service of many able men are not so much attributable to the lure
10. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 581.
11. Id. (footnote omitted). See OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 123 (Supp. 1973).
12. Report at 534-35.
13. On July 1, 1974, compensation for trial judges will range from $14,885 to $22,-
170; members of the two highest courts will receive $27,040. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §
285 (Supp. 1973). Low compensation is not confined to judges but permeates the ju-
dicial department; moreover some disparities exist. For example, legal assistants and
law referees of the supreme court and referees of the court of criminal appeals may
currently be paid a maximum of $16,750, whereas law clerks of the court of appeals
are limited to $7,250. Id.
[Vol. 10: 91
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of the private sector and the federal civil service as to the general lack
of faith in [the Legislature's] willingness to improve judicial compensa-
tion."14  Unfortunately, the remarks fell on deaf ears. 15  There can
be little doubt that inadequate compensation is a serious impediment
to the maintenance of high standards in the judiciary.
Appellate Court Dockets
A backlog of cases in appellate courts is a perennial problem. Okla-
homa's backlog primarily is in cases in the court of criminal appeals
and, in the supreme court, "an ever increasing number of petitions to
review by certiorari the decisions of the intermediate courts."' 6  Not
so clear is whether the supreme court's backlog also consists of cases
where the record is yet incomplete and of cases it chooses not to assign.
There is no backlog in the court of appeals; cases assigned to it are
finally decided within a few weeks after completed records are received.
Oklahoma's backlog thus presents two distinct problems for which dif-
ferent solutions are required.
1. Congestion in the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The appellate backlog in criminal cases results primarily from the
facts that only the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction of such
cases and that there are just too many of them for the three members
of that court to handle. It has been proposed in the Legislature that
the number of judges on that court be increased to five. Expanding
the court's manpower would have the immediate effect of reducing the
the number of docketed cases per judge and, up to 'a point, is a practi-
cable course of action providing at least a temporary solution. It is well
recognized, however, that the value of additional personnel may be "dis-
sipated by the increased consultation time, by the difficulties inherent
in drafting opinions to accommodate multiple points of view, and by
the administrative problems involved in increased personnel."' 7  The
search therefore should be for a court structure that can be adapted
to probable future needs.
The model state judicial article approved by the American Bar
Association contemplates a two-tiered appellate court system in which
14. Report at 531.
15. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
16. Report at 531.
17. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 594.
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jurisdiction is shared. Translating that article into Oklahoma's existing
system would mean that criminal appeals in the first instance could
be made in the court of criminal appeals only in cases where the death
penalty or imprisonment for a period of twenty-five years or more has
been imposed. In other cases appeals would be made in the court of
appeals.
A division of the appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases in the
manner proposed should be accompanied by statutes designed to insure
efficiency and uniformity within the system. Both courts should have
"the power to review all questions of law, and to the extent provided
by rule, to review and revise the sentence imposed."18  The court of
criminal appeals should be given general superintendent control in
criminal matters over the court of appeals. It should be given the pow-
er not only to review by certiorari decisions in the court of appeals
but also to transfer cases to itself or among divisions of the intermediate
court and, in its discretion, to accept cases from that court by certifica-
tion for transfer on motion of the court, the state, or a defendant.
Immediate and future advantages would flow from the proposed
division of criminal appellate jurisdiction. The number of docketed
cases per judge is immediately reduced. The manner in which jurisdic-
tion is divided is clear enough to eliminate jurisdictional disputes. The
court of criminal appeals can exercise its transfer power "whenever the
urgency of the case or the importance of the legal questions presented,
or both, merit direct appeal;' ' 9 at the same time it can keep its docket
within the bounds by the discretionary exercise of its certiorari powers.
Moreover, in view of the dominance in criminal matters of the Supreme
Court of the United States, a burdensome three-tiered appellate system
is neither established for every criminal case nor required in any such
case in the sound exercise by the court of criminal appeals of its transfer
power.
The existing divisions of the court of appeals, if their dockets per-
mit, can be invested with criminal jurisdiction. As a practical alterna-
tive, in view of the specialized nature of issues most frequently raised
in criminal appeals, a new, criminal division of that court can be cre-
ated. And, as the incidence of criminal appeals may increase in the
future, additional divisions or panels can be added to the court of ap-
18. ABA MODEL JUDICIAL ARTICLE FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONS § 2B (1962).
19. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 601.
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peals, at the same time permitting the court of criminal appeals to keep
its calendar within reasonable bounds.20
2. Congestion in the Supreme Court.
If it is proper to assume that the backlog of cases in the supreme
court has resulted from adding to its normal caseload of original pro-
ceedings and all civil appeals, "an ever increasing number of petitions
to review by certiorari the decisions of the intermediate court,"'" the
problem has been caused by too much jurisdiction and not enough
sound policy.
The constitution provides that "all appeals shall be made to the
supreme court, which may, by rule, determine the method of assign-
ment to, and recall from, the intermediate appellate courts until other-
wise provided by statute." 2
No change in the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction has yet
been made by statute and, as a result, all appeals in civil cases must
be filed in that court. Of such a system, Judge Hufstedler has said:
Under [this] method the supreme court screens all of the
appeals in the first instance and transfers those it does not
wish initially to hear to the lower appellate court. There
are such severe drawbacks to this method that it cannot be
recommended. The supreme court would spend far more
time upon the screening process than it could possibly be
worth, and, in the event litigation rises to the proportions it
has in California, for example, the burden would paralyze the
court. Even if the volume of litigation did not reach such
proportions, it is a waste of judicial time to have the cases
reviewed potentially three times: once by the supreme court
in the first instance, again by the intermediate court if the
case is transferred, and a third time if the supreme court is
dissatisfied with the decision of the intermediate appellate
court. The value of having an intermediate appellate court
is seriously impaired by permitting direct appeal to the su-
preme court as a matter of right. No state has gone this
far. . . .23
No state, that is, except Oklahoma, which did so later in the same year
in which Judge Hufstedler delivered her address.
In spite of the drawbacks inherent in a system that centers appel-
20. See text accompanying notes 28-29, infra.
21. Report at 531.
22. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
23. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 599 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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late review in the highest court, Oklahoma's system could have been
made more nearly problem-free had sound policies governing the ap-
pellate jurisdiction and its distribution been made.
First, the supreme court could have established, at least for its
internal use, guidelines to be followed in deciding whether to retain
a case for its own resolution or to assign it for decision in the court
of appeals. No particular pattern of case assignment can be discerned
from a reading of all of the published opinions of the supreme court
and the court of appeals. Cases presenting matters of first impression,
involving questions of state or federal constitutional law, or turning on
points of foreign law-all kinds of cases-apparently have been scat-
tered at random without much thought as to which tribunal most appro-
priately should render a "final" decision.
Second, the supreme court could have established a sound policy
governing issuance of the writ of certiorari to review decisions in the
court of appeals. Under existing procedures, it is relatively easy and
inexpensive for a disappointed litigant to petition the court for a writ.
Having already paid the fifty-dollar deposit to cover costs when he
originally filed his appeal, he is not required to pay an additional fee
to invoke the court's certiorari jurisdiction.2 4 He need then only pre-
pare a short petition for the writ, put a new cover on the brief presented
in support of a rehearing before the court of appeals and now address
it to the supreme court as his certiorari brief, and hope the court will
grant the writ. Decisions by a majority of the supreme court to grant
certiorari apparently are made on an ad hoc basis. Moreover no partic-
ular "policy" can be deduced from reading opinions of the court which
have affirmed or reversed decisions in the court of appeals. Rather
than deciding major policy questions, the supreme court seems some-
times merely to take a different view of things than did the court of
appeals.2 5 Had the supreme court, following the lead of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 28 announced standards governing certiorari
review and required a convincing showing of the need for review, it
might not now be so inundated with petitions for the writ.
Third, the publication and stare decisis policies established in rela-
tion to opinions of the court of appeals encourage certiorari petitions.
24. OKUA. STAT. tit. 20, § 15 (1971); Report at 531.
25. Compare, for example, the opinions of the two courts in Lohman v. National
Bank of Commerce, 44 OxLA. B. ASS'N J. 2954 (Sup. Ct. 1973), rev'g 43 OKLA. B.
Ass'N J. 2147 (Ct. App. 1972).
26. See U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 19, 23.
[Vol. 10:91
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Until recently, all opinions of the court of appeals were published, but
unofficially, and with the following caution: "(This Opinion Not to
Be Considered as Precedent or Authority and Not for Publication in
the Official Reporter)." In spite of the limitation placed on the value
of the court of appeals' opinions, they were frequently brought to the
attention of trial judges and often followed, as well they should be.
Moreover in briefs directed to the supreme court, large portions of
the language used in arguments supportive of similar issues have some-
times been lifted from court of appeals' opinions, without, of course,
citing a case as authority, though on occasion credit has been given
to an opinion's author.
On September 24, 1973, the supreme court announced new poli-
cies concerning courts of appeals' opinions:
Opinions of the Court of Appeals which resolve novel
or unusual issues, when unsuperseded and unmodified by
the Supreme Court, may be released for publication in the
official (Pacific) reporter concurrently with issuance of
mandate upon request made to the clerk of the Supreme
Court by the presiding judge of the division that handed
down the opinion sought to be published. No opinion so
published shall have precedential effect but may be consid-
ered persuasive. It shall bear the notation "Released for
publication by order of the Court of Appeals." An opinion
of the Court of Appeals that is specifically authorized by
the Supreme Court for publication in the official reporter
and bears the notation "Approved for publication by the Su-
preme Court" shall be accorded precedential value.
The change is not likely to reduce the incidence of certiorari petitions.
At least, however, officially published opinions of the court of appeals
will now be digested and can easily be found.
Court of appeals opinions designated for publication should be
published immediately in the official reporter. Moreover, a principle
of law established in such an opinion, so long as it is not reversed,
should be binding in all trial courts of the state. The supreme court
could use its certiorari power to resolve any conflicting decisions which
might occur among divisions of the court of appeals. The proposed
policy more nearly accords than does present policy with that followed
in the federal system and in other states. If adopted, it should tend
to reduce quests for "authoritative" decisions.
Perhaps the Oklahoma Supreme Court's congestion problems
could be made manageable merely by adopting sound policies regarding
19741
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its appellate jurisdiction in spite of the fact that "[t]he modem trend
in structuring a two-tiered appellate system is to eliminate all direct
appeals as a matter of right to the supreme court, save only appeals
in criminal cases in which the death penalty has been imposed or im-
prisonment of such length that it approaches a life term.' '27  It does
seem worthwhile, however, to contemplate both a restructuring of Okla-
homa's appellate court system and a reallocation of appellate jurisdic-
tion.
The ABA's model state judicial article envisions only a single court
of last resort, whereas Oklahoma currently has one court of last resort
for civil cases and another for criminal cases. As an alternative to
the earlier suggested dividing of criminal appellate jurisdiction between
the court of criminal appeals and the court of appeals, the ABA model
could be adopted.28 Thus direct review in the supreme court would
be available as of right only in criminal cases where a sentence of death
or imprisonment for a period of twenty-five years or more had been
imposed. Other criminal appeals would be made in the court of crim-
inal appeals, which would be of the same stature in criminal cases that
the court of appeals is in civil cases, or which could become a division
of the court of appeals. All appeals in civil cases would be made in
the court of appeals; moreover that court should be given jurisdiction
in original proceedings to review decisions of administrative tribunals
such as the state industrial court.
Given the power to transfer urgent and important cases to itself
and to review by certiorari decisions in the intermediate court, the su-
preme court would thus be given the ability both
to keep6 its calendar within the bounds of its resources and
...to serve the primary functions of a court of last resort,
i.e., deciding major policy questions, giving shape and di-
rection to the growth of substantive and procedural law, giv-
ing authoritative expression upon questions as to which there
has developed a conflict among lower courts, and finally ex-
ercising its supervisory power over the entire judicial struc-
ture.29
Final decisions in most cases would be achieved in the intermedi-
ate court. In other cases, decisions in the intermediate court would
27. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 599 (footnote omitted).
28. A restructuring of the appellate court system can be accomplished by the Legis-
lature without the need for further constitutional amendment. OKLA. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1.
29. Hufstedler, supra note 4, at 601.
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be helpful to the supreme court. Writing about constitutional question
cases, the late Chief Justice of the United States, Harlan Fiske Stone,
has said: "The public little realizes how much is accomplished by
passing through an intermediate court-the clash of counsel, the
preparation of briefs and judicial decision, before the case comes to
the Supreme Court-often does much to clarify the question and the
minds of court and counsel in dealing with it."230
Restructuring the intermediate appellate court and conferring on
it the bulk of original appellate jurisdiction makes the judicial system
adaptable to probable future needs. As the incidence of apellate litiga-
tion increases, additional judges can be added to the court of appeals
to meet caseload needs. Moreover, the court of appeals should be per-
mitted to achieve maximum efficiency by being authorized to sit
throughout the state in panels, such as is the practice among the United
States Courts of Appeals. Rather than having to create additional
three-judge divisions, a single judge could thus be added to the court
at any time to keep its docket within bounds.
Finally, in any consideration of appellate system reform, the Leg-
islature should renew its efforts to reduce the size of the supreme court.
Only Oklahoma and four other states-Iowa, Mississippi, Texas and
Washington-have nine-member supreme courts. Almost half the
states have seven-member courts; the rest have between three and five
members. Those factors which militate against a substantial increase
in membership on the court of criminal appeals also indicate that a
reduction in supreme court membership may be desirable. 31
Judicial Selection and Tenure
No discussion of judicial reform is complete unless it treats judicial
selection and tenure, a topic much discussed but elusive of a consensus.
Oklahoma, for example, has not settled on a single pattern. Judges
of the state industrial court are appointed by the Governor with the
advice and consent of the Senate and serve six-year terms. 2  District
and associate district judges, for a four-year term, and judges of the
court of appeals, for a six-year term, are elected in nonpartisan elec-
tions.33 Special district judges are appointed by the district judges and
30. Quoted in A. MAsoN, HARLAN FxsE SToNB: PiLAR op THE LAw 386 (1956).
31. See text preceeding note 17 supra.
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 69.1 (1971).
33. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 8(f), 9; OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.9 (1971).
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serve at their pleasure.8 4 Justices of the supreme court and judges of
the court of criminal appeals, after initial appointment by the Governor
from a list of nominees submitted to him by the Judicial Nominating
Commission, may be retained in office for six-year terms and face the
electorate only on a "retention-in-office" ballot.85
Perhaps any method of judicial selection has drawbacks. Election
of judges, whether on a nonpartisan or "retention-in-office" ballot, is
accomplished by an electorate largely unfamiliar with the candidate
and his qualifications. Furthermore, on what basis shall judicial candi-
dates "campaign"? Nor is the appointment of judges through a nom-
inating commission free of shortcomings. Many well qualified lawyers
may be reluctant to "apply" for a judicial post; failure to be selected
as a nominee or to be appointed is potentially embarrassing. A nom-
inating commission may be subjected to substantial gubernatorial influ-
ence or pressure in the selection, or non-selection, of nominees. Lastly
the commission's deliberations are not subject to public scrutiny.
Perhaps what is most needed in judicial selection is examination
in public of a potential judge's qualifications and background. Guber-
natorial nomination and Senate confirmation appears to be a reasonable
means of selection, especially if coupled with the requirements of en-
dorsement by an arm of the organized bar and of public hearings before
an appropriate Senate committee after a staff investigation of the nom-
inee. Properly utilized, the process proposed should eliminate doubts
as to a nominee's qualifications and resolve possible conflicts of inter-
est, and it is suitable to selection of all but special district judges.
In regard to judicial tenure, there is one point upon which near
unanimity of opinion exists: the decisional process must be insulated
from politics and political pressures. Oklahoma's system, by requiring
electoral retention or re-selection of judges after short periods or terms,
may fall short of that desirable goal. Federal judges are insulated from
politics by lifetime tenure during good behavior-a plan not without
critics, though much of the criticism would be eliminated if removal
from office could be accomplished other than by impeachment. An
alternative for Oklahoma is longer terms, which incidentally should make
the judicial office more attractive to well qualified persons. Judges of
the New York Court of Appeals, for example, serve fourteen-year
terms. Efforts should be made to lengthen the terms of Oklahoma
34. OxLA. CONST. art. VII, § 8(h).
35. O..A- CoNsT. art VII-B, §§ 2,4,5.
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judges to insure that they may reach decisions independent of political
considerations. The power of the Court on the Judiciary to remove
and retire judges from office for cause, but not including political
grounds,36 largely reduces objections to longer judicial tenure.
Conclusion
While Oklahoma's judicial system is a good one, it can be im-
proved. We should never be satisified with the state of the judiciary
if it can be bettered by change. If these thoughts for judicial reform
receive reactions, favorable or unfavorable, or stir up controversy, the
purpose of this essay has been achieved.
36. See OXLA. CONST. art. VII-A, § I(b), (c).
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